Train danger heads-up

[Leo Wetula]

NTSB has already stated that the proposed brake rule that people have been talking about would not have made a difference and has asked people to stop spreading misinformation.

https://abcnews.go.com/US/ohio-train-de ... d=97281671

Where is the federal leadership (other than NTSB)? Hint: there is none.

[Dan Alaimo]

Does the City (Lakewood)), where I'm posting, or the region, including Westlake where I lived, have either an evacuation plan, or emergency management specialists who could create such a plan?

Speaking as someone who has seen these same tanker cars up close at the Andrews Ave. crossing many times, this isn't an overreaction. If not the brakes, it wouldn't take much.

[cmager]

NTSB has already stated that the proposed brake rule that people have been talking about would not have made a difference and has asked people to stop spreading misinformation.
https://abcnews.go.com/US/ohio-train-de ... d=97281671
Where is the federal leadership (other than NTSB)? Hint: there is none.

from the article"
"The NTSB chair addressed speculation that a rule on electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) breaks -- if implemented -- would have prevented the train derailment, which she said was "FALSE." "The ECP braking rule would've applied ONLY to HIGH HAZARD FLAMMABLE TRAINS. The train that derailed in East Palestine was a MIXED FREIGHT TRAIN containing only 3 placarded Class 3 flammable liquids cars," she tweeted. "This means even if the rule had gone into effect, this train wouldn't have had ECP brakes."

It's apparently accurate to say that the rule as written (and later rescinded) would not have had the desired effect. But it does not mean that ECP brakes if present would not have provided a benefit of minimizing the derailment.

[Leo Wetula]

Hi Dan,

I posted something yesterday, but for some reason it failed to appear. In short, your questions are important ones. Unfortunately, as someone noted in an earlier post, federal law re: railroad safety preempts state/local law. It may seem outrageous, but there is nothing state/local governments can do even to prevent trains from totally blocking crossings for extended periods----even if there is a hospital on the other side (not like we have one of those) or a school, etc. Please see below for one recent example.

https://www.courtnewsohio.gov/cases/202 ... _OHiSbMLEY

This is not just an Ohio thing. I worked for the Federal Railroad Administration (in a non-safety role) until a few years ago and was truly shocked to learn this and to see cases around the country where railroads blocked crossings, restricting access to essential safety and other services, and local communities were totally helpless to do anything about it.

And you suggest, there is one thing that local communities can do and that is plan for disaster. However, that is a poor substitute for prevention.

To cmager:

I am not disagreeing with you at all. It’s possible, but I don’t think we know yet whether ECP brakes would have minimized the impact of this accident. I do trust the NTSB, so I am waiting to hear what they have to say.

Again, however, I do think it boils down to a question of federal leadership. If not this rule, then why not another rule that would have covered situations like this? Why don’t we know more about precisely what is being transported by freight trains through our communities? Safety should be a non-partisan issue. Since the federal government is the only level that has authority over these issues, the lack of more safety regulation is purely the result of a lack of federal leadership on these matters. This statement is coming from someone who understands and values the tremendous positive role that freight rail plays in our country. But when the freight railroads have more power than the government, that is a problem IMHO.

[Dan Alaimo]

"And you suggest, there is one thing that local communities can do and that is plan for disaster. However, that is a poor substitute for prevention."

Thanks, Leo
You clearly know more than me about this topic.
The prevention side of the discussion is quite problematic, and made worse by the monolithic resistance by the railroad. It strikes me that they have taken a page from the NRA's playback, mainly to downplay, distract and stall until the crisis blows over. We can't do much about that besides letting our elected representatives know we demand that they speak and act.

But locally and personally we can plan for disaster as we can now see that one like East Palestine is very possible here. Municipalities need trained emergency management specialists, as well as disaster response plans that include evacuation. Individually, households need to prepare "go-bags." We may well need them. It's not panic. It's prudence.

BTW: I'm missing Dan O'Malley in this conversation. It seems to me that it touches on some of his core interests.

[Jim O'Bryan]

Well according to reports at the scene, it was probably a broken axle, possible being brought on by a wheel bearing failure.

Which means, yes it can happen here.

Having visited East Palestine yesterday, the real problem is the clean-up or the lack luster show of cleaning up.

The city is riddled with streams and rivers. Most are at least 5' across and most are being cleaned up with 2" hoses!

The water is sucked into a 55 gallon drum, through a diaper and back into the water. Diapers are changed "regularly."

After the visit, I found a town over very scared people, worried about their future, and everyone else putting on a show of cleaning-up. I have seen this many times with oil spills. They drag their feet, make feeble attempts mostly show, as the chemicals dissipate or move down stream.

You can see the 100 photos at:
http://lakewoodobserver.com/photoblogs/ ... lment-2023

Maybe the real question is, can a city going through tough times, with rivers running underground survive a disaster like this?

.

[Jim O'Bryan]

Taken today at the Andrews RR Crossing, many more went by, this was the best photo.

I have to believe, a bunch of these cracked open would cause some issues.

I have been assured a hydrochloride acid spill train accident would be no problem.

That's good news.

Now what about the 30 cars burning spread over two football fields. Lakewood singular track is raised so physics would indicate, potentially further.

The problem as I understand was the bearing and axle.

.

.

[Mark Kindt]

Tank Capacity is 31,000 gallons per graphic in WSJ this past weekend.

[Jim O'Bryan]

Tank Capacity is 31,000 gallons per graphic in WSJ this past weekend.

This was a small tanker, not that it matters.

A couple observations.

The first the accident took place where there was room for cars to go. The actual wreckage would cover a couple football field. This is on flat tracks.

Now then Lakewood's tracks for the most part are raised. This would in theory allow the cars to go farther, Lay two football fields over any part of the track in Lakewood and say to yourself,"That is an acceptable loss" Think that is hard, now zoom back and look at 50 blocks. Those people had to move out but can come back. You were involved in a toxic clean-up and now must mention it in the sale of your house. Now the city would have already taken a value hit the second the accident happens. So now your return is diminished, now add in the extra testing, and the health issues. Are we still at an acceptable level?

This is what people are arguing about on social media. Not asking for better safety, but demanding we buck up and take it like good little soldiers.

It is nuts. The chances are low for us being involved in a nightmare like this. But we also can ask for safety measure reintroduced or made better.

.

[Jim O'Bryan]

To add to the discussion. Yesterday I tracked down and electrician who works for the railro, not Norfolk Southern.

The bearing and axle heat should have been caught by a hot box soon enough to stop the train. The hotbox is about the size of a shoebox and is placed at various distances on the rail line. The distance is not regulated. It is on the tracks, but on the outside of the track.

There is a sensor that triggers it when a train goes over it, and it takes a reading on every axle/wheel bearing that goes over it. If any are “hot” it sends a radio signal to the engineer to stop the trains. The one on his line were ruffly every 24 miles. They react instantly.

He surmised it could have happened between hotboxes but very unlikely.

He thought hotbox failure, radio failure, engineer failure, NTSB will figure it out.

Hope that helps.

[Mark Kindt]

U.S. EPA Press Release on Train Derailment

Here is the link to the EPA Press Release issued yesterday:

https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-or ... -palestine

[Richard Baker]

Truck-related hazardous materials incidents caused over 16 times more fatalities from 1975 to 2021 – 380 for truck, compared with 23 for rail. Railroad fatalities totaled 893 in 2021 due to trains striking vehicles or individuals on the tracks. Your significantly more at risk crossing the railroad track than a train derailment chemical spill. If there is concern about “necessary but dangerous chemicals” transportation, rail remains the safest method.

Tracks are inspected in accordance to Federal Railroad Administration, which leave rolling stock. Before we start throwing stones at the railroad companies, over 80 percent of all railroad tanker cars are owned by leasing companies.

[Jim O'Bryan]

Truck-related hazardous materials incidents caused over 16 times more fatalities from 1975 to 2021 – 380 for truck, compared with 23 for rail. Railroad fatalities totaled 893 in 2021 due to trains striking vehicles or individuals on the tracks. Your significantly more at risk crossing the railroad track than a train derailment chemical spill. If there is concern about “necessary but dangerous chemicals” transportation, rail remains the safest method.

Tracks are inspected in accordance to Federal Railroad Administration, which leave rolling stock. Before we start throwing stones at the railroad companies, over 80 percent of all railroad tanker cars are owned by leasing companies.

Richard

I always smile when people make excuses for corporations in accidents, and wonder why?

In most of the places I post, I mention trains are the safest way to transport hazardous waste. Trucks are not an option. However there are closer to 1,000 derailments, most small, a year.

We need more from the railroads and NTSB. We need to get their numbers down to airline levels on hazardous stuff. No reason for excuses.

To me the real problem outside of safety, is financial liability. This has got to be streamlined, and taken out of the hands of individuals fighting for what they are owed. Perhaps let the government make them whole, then they go after the perp. The current system is stacked against the person that is an innocent bystander to the end of their lives as they know it.

[Dan Alaimo]

"The chances are low for us being involved in a nightmare like this."

But who wants to find out? I'd say the odds are lower - and the chances higher - than a couple of weeks ago.

All it would take is one drunken or sleepy driver to run through the barrier and the problem would hit home.

[Jim O'Bryan]

From the NTSB...

Download full report here: http://media.lakewoodobserver.com/media ... 166456.pdf


This information is preliminary and subject to change.
Norfolk Southern Railway Train Derailment
with Subsequent Hazardous Material Release
and Fires
East Palestine, Ohio
February 3, 2023
On February 3, 2023, about 8:54 p.m. local time, eastbound Norfolk Southern
Railway (NS) general merchandise freight train 32N derailed 38 railcars on main track 1 of
the NS Fort Wayne Line of the Keystone Division in East Palestine, Ohio.1 (See figure.)
The derailed equipment included 11 tank cars carrying hazardous materials that
subsequently ignited, fueling fires that damaged an additional 12 non-derailed railcars.
First responders implemented a 1-mile evacuation zone surrounding the derailment site
that affected up to 2,000 residents. There were no reported fatalities or injuries. At the
time of the accident, visibility conditions were dark and clear; the weather was 10°F with
no precipitation.
1 (a) All times in this report are local time. (b) Train 32N was traveling from Madison, Illinois, to
Conway, Pennsylvania.

Issued: February 22, 2023 Preliminary Report RRD23MR005
2
Figure. Aerial photograph of derailment site.
Train 32N comprised 2 head-end locomotives, 149 railcars, and 1 distributed
power locomotive located between railcars 109 and 110. The consist included 20
placarded hazardous materials tank cars transporting combustible liquids, flammable
liquids, and flammable gas, including vinyl chloride.2 Train 32N was traveling about 47
mph at the time of the derailment, which was less than the maximum authorized
timetable speed of 50 mph.3 Train movements near the derailment site are authorized
by cab signals and wayside signal indications with an overlaid positive train control
system and are coordinated by the NS Cleveland East train dispatcher located in
Atlanta, Georgia. The positive train control system was enabled and operating at the
time of the derailment.
Train 32N was operating with a dynamic brake application as the train passed a
wayside defect detector on the east side of Palestine, Ohio, at milepost (MP) 49.81.4
The wayside defect detector, or hot bearing detector (HBD), transmitted a critical
2 (a) Vinyl chloride is a flammable petrochemical used in the manufacture of polymer polyvinyl
chloride, or PVC. When exposed to heat, vinyl chloride can undergo a rapid polymerization reaction,
an exothermic chemical process that can pose an explosion hazard. (b) Residues of some hazardous
materials are considered flammable liquids; in this case, two placarded tank cars contained benzene
residue.
3 The train crew was governed by the rules and instructions in the NS Pittsburgh Division,
Northern Region, Timetable No. 1.
4 On a diesel-electric locomotive, dynamic braking uses electric traction motors as generators,
slowing the train and dissipating mechanical energy as heat.
3
audible alarm message instructing the crew to slow and stop the train to inspect a hot
axle. The train engineer increased the dynamic brake application to further slow and
stop the train. During this deceleration, an automatic emergency brake application
initiated, and train 32N came to a stop.5
On the Fort Wayne Line of the Keystone Division, NS has equipped their rail
network with HBD systems to assess the temperature conditions of wheel bearings
while en route. The function of the HBD is to detect overheated bearings and provide
audible real-time warnings to train crews. Train 32N passed three HBD systems on its
trip before the derailment. At MP 79.9, the suspect bearing from the 23rd car had a
recorded temperature of 38°F above ambient temperature. When train 32N passed
the next HBD, at MP 69.01, the bearing’s recorded temperature was 103°F above
ambient. The third HBD, at MP 49.81, recorded the suspect bearing’s temperature at
253°F above ambient. NS has established the following HBD alarm thresholds (above
ambient temperature) and criteria for bearings:
• Between 170°F and 200°F, warm bearing (non-critical); stop and inspect
• A difference between bearings on the same axle greater than or equal
to 115°F (non-critical); stop and inspect
• Greater than 200°F (critical); set out railcar
After the train stopped, the crew observed fire and smoke and notified the
Cleveland East dispatcher of a possible derailment. With dispatcher authorization, the
crew applied handbrakes to the two railcars at the head of the train, uncoupled the
head-end locomotives, and moved the locomotives about 1 mile from the uncoupled
railcars. Responders arrived at the derailment site and began response efforts.
On February 5, responders mitigated the fire, but five derailed DOT-105
specification tank cars (railcars 28–31 and 55) carrying 115,580 gallons of vinyl
chloride continued to concern authorities because the temperature inside one tank
car was still rising. This increase in temperature suggested that the vinyl chloride was
undergoing a polymerization reaction, which could pose an explosion hazard.
Responders scheduled a controlled venting of the five vinyl chloride tank cars to
release and burn the vinyl chloride, expanded the evacuation zone to a 1-mile by 2-
mile area, and dug ditches to contain released vinyl chloride liquid while it vaporized
and burned. The controlled venting began about 4:40 p.m. on February 6 and
continued for several hours.
While on scene, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigators
examined railroad equipment and track conditions; reviewed data from the signal
5 An automatic emergency brake application is the full application of a train’s main air brakes.
An automatic emergency brake application can occur when a train experiences a separation that
disconnects the air brake hoses between railcars.
4
system, wayside defect detectors, local surveillance cameras, and the lead
locomotive’s event recorder and forward-facing and inward-facing image recorders;
and completed interviews. NTSB investigators identified and examined the first railcar
to derail, the 23rd railcar in the consist. Surveillance video from a local residence
showed what appeared to be a wheel bearing in the final stage of overheat failure
moments before the derailment. The wheel bearing and affected wheelset have been
collected as evidence and will be examined by the NTSB. The vinyl chloride tank car
top fittings, including the relief valves, were also removed and examined by the NTSB
on scene. The top fittings will be shipped to Texas for testing under the direction of
the NTSB.
The hazardous material tank cars have been decontaminated. NTSB
investigators returned to Ohio on February 21, 2023, to examine each hazardous
material tank car, document damage, and secure evidence for laboratory analysis.
The NTSB’s investigation is ongoing. Future investigative activity will focus on
the wheelset and bearing; tank car design and derailment damage; a review of the
accident response, including the venting and burning of the vinyl chloride; railcar
design and maintenance procedures and practices; NS use of wayside defect
detectors; and NS railcar inspection practices.
The NTSB is not involved in air monitoring, testing of water quality,
environmental remediation, or evacuation orders. Questions on environmental issues
should be referred to the Environmental Protection Agency.
Parties to the investigation include the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, Ohio State Highway Patrol, the
Village of East Palestine, Norfolk Southern Railway, Trinity Industries Leasing
Company, GATX Corporation, the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, the International
Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers, the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, and the International Association of Fire
Fighters.