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Cuyahoga County about to move to Bad Voting System

Posted: Sat Apr 22, 2006 1:58 pm
by Donald Farris
Hi,
When I first heard years ago about electronic voting I was excited. I'm a computer guy and those punch cards seemed so old fashioned.

Then I read over and over again about the poor quality of voting systems employed in America and I quickly lost my excitement.

May 2nd we in Cuyahoga County enter the era of electronic voting machines. I have heard how easy it is to manipulate the totals on these machines and when you combine that to the fact Diebold employees had dial-in access on election night 2004 to the results, I question the final result.


In the Cleveland area, an estimated 7000 voters were knocked off the voter registration rolls when Cuyahoga County Board of Elections adopted the Diebold registration system. The e-voting machine companies can control everything electronically, from voter registration to election day vote recording to final vote tabulation and recounting.
from Is the Mainstream Media finally getting half the rigged voting machine story?

How much of an issue is this? Democratic Chairman Howard Dean has awoken and now (perhaps too late) is calling the removal of the electronic voting machines.



David Grossman: How concerned are you and others at the DNC about Diebold voting machines, and…

Dean: Very.

Grossman: …other issues of voting fraud?

Dean: Very concerned. I am actually calling Democratic public officials. I called one yesterday to try to head off the use of these machines. We spent half a million dollars after the election with a task force, headed by Donna Brazile but made up of academics that were relatively neutral and very careful, to look at these machines very carefully. We concluded that they are easily hackable and cannot be verified and that they are not reliable. And we concluded the best machine you can use is an opti-scan machine because at least it has paper ballots and you still get the rapidity of the counting. There are Democratic officials who still use these because they get huge amounts of money from the federal government to buy these kinds of machines, well, not just … the other machines, the Sequoias and Diebolds and such. I’m not an expert on these machines, although someone did actually teach me how to hack one on live TV once, which was kind of fun. It’s pretty shocking -- I know so little about the intricacies of all this stuff so … I wouldn’t pretend I … I did change the vote totals on the machines, but I don’t know if it was really -- could have been a program that was elaborately programmed to fool me into thinking I was doing something I really wasn’t doing.

But yes, our conclusion is that these machines are not reliable and they undermine confidence in democracy. I, as you know, keep in pretty constant touch with lots of people around the country, many of the people who supported me for President are people who are very much involved in exposing this. There have been some success stories in North Carolina, for example, the legislature wrote the bill so that essentially Diebold’s unwillingness to provide source codes or any kind of reliability disqualified them from the bidding. So, we’re pushing back on this hard. Republican legislators seem to think these are great things. We don’t get very far in states that are controlled by Republican governors and legislatures, but we have had some success. We believe it’s important to keep talking about these machines. These machines are a problem. This is not some Internet conspiracy; this is a serious problem that faces American democracy. These machines are not reliable and they shouldn’t be used. We should not be using machines in this country where the results of the vote can’t be verified after the fact. Period. Any machines.


See: Breakfast with Mr. Dean

So, given all this aren't you excited about casting your first vote on Diebold voting equipment?

Posted: Sat Apr 22, 2006 2:13 pm
by Donald Farris
Hi,
Here's an article on a test of Diebold equipment conducted in Leon County, Fl.

Devastating hack proven



At the beginning of the test election the memory card programmed by Harri Hursti was inserted into an Optical Scan Diebold voting machine. A "zero report" was run indicating zero votes on the memory card. In fact, however, Hursti had pre-loaded the memory card with plus and minus votes.

The eight ballots were run through the optical scan machine. The standard Diebold-supplied "ender card" was run through as is normal procedure ending the election. A results tape was run from the voting machine.

Correct results should have been: Yes:2 ; No:6

However, just as Hursti had planned, the results tape read: Yes:7 ; No:1

The results were then uploaded from the optical scan voting machine into the GEMS central tabulator, a step cited by Diebold as a protection against memory card hacking. The central tabulator is the "mother ship" that pulls in all votes from voting machines. However, the GEMS central tabulator failed to notice that the voting machines had been hacked.
The results in the central tabulator read:

Yes:7 ; No:1

This videotaped testing session was witnessed by Black Box Voting investigators Bev Harris and Kathleen Wynne, Florida Fair Elections Coalition Director Susan Pynchon, security expert Dr. Herbert Thompson, and Susan Bernecker, a former candidate for New Orleans city council who videotaped Sequoia-brand touch-screen voting machines in her district recording vote after vote for the wrong candidate.

The Hursti Hack requires a moderate level of inside access. It is, however, accomplished without being given any password and with the same level of access given thousands of poll workers across the USA. It is a particularly dangerous exploit, because it changes votes in a one-step process that will not be detected in any normal canvassing procedure, it requires only a single a credit-card sized memory card, any single individual with access to the memory cards can do it, and it requires only a small piece of equipment which can be purchased off the Internet for a few hundred dollars.


Now, you and I know election fraud is a federal offense, so we would never do it. But, we also know our President GW Bush said,
Well, when the president does it that means that it is not illegal"
Given statements like that, I'm not so sure everyone would agree it's illegal.

The "need" for electronic voting systems:

Posted: Sun Apr 23, 2006 6:28 pm
by SteveLeach
Let me preface this by saying that I am a "computer guy", as well. Being a programmer, I see significant dangers to any electronic voting system - especially a closed source propriatary product produced by Diebold or anyone else.

The basic assumptions behind electronic voting systems seem to be rather flawed. First, it seems to be an unquestioned given that we need these systems. Why? Well because we get instant results. But why do we need instant results? What appears on a ballot that cannot wait a week or two for all votes to be counted?

Second, there is the debate on whether or not there should be a manditory paper trail for purposes of recounts. This, again, is flawed. Most rules do not require a recount unless results are extremely close. If the machine is producing significantly flawed results through either intentional or unintentional error, there would be no recount. Further, a printout of votes recorded by the machine does not constitute a useable paper trail: there is no guarantee that these are the votes actually cast, only that they are the votes the machine has recorded and will be identical to those it uses to produce its count. Such a printout would be useless for verification purposes.

A minimally acceptible system would be something along these lines: 1) Voters would be provided with a paper ballot which, after being marked, would be fed through an OCR scanner - These cards are to be kept as a REAL paper trail. 2) The system would use only open source software - security by obscurity doesn't work, and open source will be the only way to provide some insurance against malacious backdoors. 3) The system will provide a preliminary tally only. Election results will not be certified until such time as a complete physical count of the cards has been completed.

Now, this means that we have instant, though unofficial, results. It also means that those results will almost certainly be correct - there is no point in tampering with the system if the results will be thrown out anyway in a few days time once a real count has been completed. It also means that computer provides a ballance against human interferance as well.

I would point out, however, that there is still no NEED for such a system - the only advantage that electronic voting provides is instantly available results for the news networks to report on. Ballot issues do not take effect the day after the polls close, nor is there a transition of public offices the next day.

Posted: Mon Apr 24, 2006 2:39 am
by Stan Austin
Don and Steve--- All I can say is given Cleveland's world wide reputation for starting dissasters such as the North American power failure I am just holding my breath, waiting for a debacle on Tuesday.

Having been on all sides of the election machinery I just don't see how new, sophisticated equipment can be introduced and not have some very major glitches occur.

Even though most of us on this deck a fairly computer savvy how many times have we had a "slap the forhead" moment of temporary stupidity? Now, if you look at the typical booth worker who will be responsible for operating this new equipment I think you can see a recipe for disaster.

I think the one specific thing that I forsee is the deletion or non tabulation of votes for partial or entire precincts if a particular machine is not operated correctly.

So what are the recourses or remedies in a close election such as the recent council race in Ward I? Or an election in just one precinct for a local option?

Even with our current punch card system the potentially fatal flaw is the necessity to physically transport the punch cards, the only record, to the Board of Elections. It's never happened but there could be a destructive crash on the way there. Better to have card readers on the spot.

Say what you will, but with the old lever type machines there were several copies of results in several locations. And, with one step you got the tabulations from a machine. Any good politician only needs to look at one or two precincts in order to make a prediction if speed is the driving force.

Back in my campaigns in the 1970's we were set up to have total, city wide results by 8:00 PM, 1/2 hour after the polls closed.

All I can say is "hold your breath this Tuesday!"

Stan Austin